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 “We must be the change we want to see in the world”:  
Integrating norms and identities through social interaction 
 
Each time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, or strikes 
out against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope, and crossing each other from 
a million different centers of energy and daring those ripples build a current which 
can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance. (Robert F. 
Kennedy) 
The Occupy Movement, the Arab Spring, Kony2012 and countless instances of 
NIMBY (Not In My BackYard) activism suggest that new social movements continue to 
emerge to create socio-political change. Here we ask, to what extent can political psychology 
explain the origin of new movements? As we detail below, the major research streams in both 
political science and social psychology are best suited to explaining social change in terms of 
existing social movements, institutions, and identities. This has been a productive focus: 
social movements often arise from conflict between groups defined by class, ethnicity, 
language and religion, and from political institutions. However, cases where social changes 
begin without pre-existing political parties or pressure groups are less well understood. For 
example, we have an excellent choice of theories to account for industrial action by union 
members, but there is far less choice when it comes to explaining the processes by which 
workers form those unions. We propose that when people think about and then criticize 
existing social structures or social groups, this act of speaking out helps to create new social 
movements that can act to transform the original social structure. Thus people become, in the 
terms attributed to Mohandas K. Ghandi, ‘the change they want to see in the world’.  
In focusing on the foundational moments of social movements, our analysis 
complements literature that explains processes after such movements have formed, including 
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social psychological analyses of activism and social movement development (Klandermans & 
Oegema, 1987); resistance (Haslam & Reicher, 2012), and of collective action participation 
(van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). We assume that emerging social movements first 
recognize that some state of affairs is unsatisfactory, and that the evaluation of those 
circumstances creates the opportunity for reform (cf. Kitschelt, 1989; Runciman, 1966). We 
then argue that, although existing social groups and structures are crucial, reflection on and 
communication about grievances with those groups and structures have received insufficient 
attention as explanatory principles. As de Tocqueville put it: 
It is almost never when a state of things is the most detestable that it is smashed, but 
when, beginning to improve, it permits men to breathe, to reflect, to communicate 
their thoughts with each other, and to gauge by what they already have the extent of 
their rights and their grievances. The weight, although less heavy, seems then all the 
more unbearable. 
de Tocqueville, 1853 [Letter to Pierre Freslon, 23 September 1853 Selected Letters, p. 
296, emphasis added] 
We argue that the reflection and communication to which de Tocqueville referred has 
been underemphasized in social change research since that time. We seek to redress this 
imbalance here. 
Overview 
We propose that new shared social identities develop when people are motivated to 
communicate their opinions and ideas about social change because they encounter a conflict 
between the way the world is and the way they believe the world should be (related to what 
Packer, 2008, termed a normative conflict). Perceptions of “the way things are” and “the way 
things should be” are captured by a key distinction between injunctive norms (norms about 
how people should behave in a given situation) and descriptive norms (norms about how 
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people actually do behave in a given situation; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). We 
propose that the emergence of coordinated social change movements requires (a) the 
articulation of ideas about desired injunctive social norms that are (b) negotiated, validated 
and agreed upon during interaction (c) to become the basis of a new shared social identity 
(Table 1; Figure 1).  
 Through communicating their ideas about desired injunctive social norms, people can 
convert those ideas from subjective personal perceptions to socially validated and socially 
shared cognitions (Festinger, 1954). Reaching agreement about those ideas allows those 
injunctive norms to represent and express collective self. This consensus increases action 
confidence (Smith & Postmes, 2011b) and provides a solid psychological foundation for 
social change action (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1998). If no consensus 
is reached, either because there is silence or unresolved disagreement, individual change 
action is possible but genuinely coordinated efforts towards change is unlikely. This is partly 
because in the absence of communication it is more difficult to infer what the shared norms 
for social action are (Smith & Postmes, 2009, 2011a), but also in part because silence limits 
validation (Koudenburg, Postmes, & Gordijn, 2011).  
Therefore, the processes of discussing ideas and reaching consensus can lead to the 
emergence of new social movements by enabling the people involved the discussions to 
validate each other’s beliefs, and to give them the confidence to coordinate, organize and 
jointly act on them. To the extent that the new identity is founded upon shared injunctive 
norms (what we come to believe is the right thing to do), then participation in social change 
action (doing what we agree is right) becomes an expression of that identity (cf. Gee & 
McGarty, 2013). People who identify with the emerging movement are likely to work 
towards shifting the undesirable descriptive norm (the status quo) towards the desired 
injunctive norm, creating change. Thus, an injunctive norm becomes the basis of the identity 
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of a new collective, forming an identity-norm nexus (INN). The formation of INNs does not 
necessarily ensure the emergence of social movements, and certainly does not ensure social 
change, but it contains the potential for social change action. 
In observing the connection between shared norms and social identities, we build on 
the normative alignment model of Thomas, McGarty and Mavor (2009) and the interactive 
model of identity formation (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Postmes, Spears, et al., 
2005). The normative alignment model provides a basis for understanding the specific 
psychological factors (norms about specific actions, emotions and beliefs) that need to be 
integrated in order to instigate and sustain pro-social collective action; and identifies 
communication as a crucial vehicle of integration. Similarly, the interactive model of identity 
formation argues that communication is a route to identity formation. We go beyond these 
models here by first systematically spelling out the nature of the interactive processes through 
which the integration of injunctive norms and identity comes about, and second, by 
identifying the boundary conditions for integration. First, we summarize existing approaches 
to social change to highlight the novel conceptual contribution of INN-formation.  
Explaining Social Change through the Activation of Existing Group Memberships and 
Existing Norms 
When some grievances emerge, existing groups, political parties, or shared identities 
are already able to represent the opinions of the people to a sufficient degree. For example, 
outrage at a man-made environmental catastrophe could be responded to by Greenpeace, 
without the need to form a new activist group. In other cases, new social cleavages are 
required – with new associated identifications – to respond to those grievances (e.g., see 
Miragliotta, 2012). Existing theory deals very well with the former case, but is unable to fully 
account for the process by which latter emerge.  
Let us illustrate this with an example: the collective response of citizens of the United 
Running head: THE IDENTITY-NORM NEXUS  6 
 
States (US) following September 11, 2001. This collective response can be explained in a 
number of different ways, all of which (reasonably) draw on existing groupings, identities 
and structures.  
After 9/11, the citizens, government and military of the US responded as a group with 
a high degree of common purpose to address an external threat. This was a collective 
response that drew upon the existing US national identity and made salient the norms 
associated with that identity. These processes could be described readily in terms of realistic 
group conflict theory (Sherif, 1966) or the social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). According to the social identity 
approach, when a social identity is salient, individuals will subscribe to the socially shared 
ingroup norms associated with that identity. In these terms, 9/11 rendered salient a national 
identity and thus sparked an outpouring of patriotic fervor. The joint resolution (CR 224) 
passed by Congress to recognize the events of 11 September called on people to “join 
together to defend and honor the Nation and its symbols of strength”. For 30 days, every US 
citizen and every community in the Nation was encouraged to display the US flag “to show 
the solidarity, resolve, and strength of the Nation” (CR 224). Election candidates thus tried to 
leverage this patriotism value in their campaigns (Strach & Sapiro, 2011). Governments and 
citizens were able to draw upon a shared sense of ‘us’ in coordinating a response (Skitka, 
Saunders, Morgan, & Wisneski, 2009).  
The reaction of US citizens to 9/11 could also be explained in terms of normative 
focus theory (Cialdini et al., 1990), which would argue that a particular social norm (e.g., 
patriotism) was made focal (i.e., salient) by the attacks and therefore was able to influence 
behavior (Cialdini et al., 1990). Similar to the social identity explanation, the threat increased 
the salience of an existing norm. From both of these perspectives, social norms and identities 
can viewed as pre-existing psychological entities that can be activated by individuals’ 
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perceptions of a threat.  
On the other hand, political scientists could treat events such as September 11
th
 as 
crises that create a cost or grievance can that in turn create windows for institutional and 
policy change (Cortell & Peterson, 1999; Kitschelt, 1986). Other highly plausible lines of 
explanation emerge from the political sociology of social movements and especially from 
relative deprivation theories (e.g., Runciman, 1966), resource mobilization theory (McCarthy 
& Zald, 1977), and political-opportunity structures theory (e.g., Tarrow, 2005). Despite the 
vast differences between these theories, they all have in common one major assumption: that 
a sense of grievance arises from an understanding of the social position of existing groups (so 
in the preceding example, US citizens can understand their position as the targets of immoral 
attacks from foreign terrorists).  
However, none of these theories can explain how new social groupings emerge from 
the existing structure to address the grievance. To fill this gap, we suggest that to react to a 
grievance, to contest social structure and to seize political opportunities, it is necessary for 
emergent political forces to validate each other and organize themselves to create a new 
social reality. In order to do that, potential political actors first need to speak out in dissent 
about their grievances. This will enable them to realize that they share their grievances with 
each other, and that these grievances can be used as a basis for political action (Simon and 
Klandermans, 2001; Thomas, McGarty & Louis, in press). They can then work towards an 
agreement on ways to begin to challenge the existing social order. 
To illustrate how our approach can explain the emergence of new groups, consider 
now the formation of social movements such as the Arab Spring, the Occupy Movement, and 
Kony 2012. These movements arose from grievances against existing social phenomena: 
national governments, perceived excesses of global capitalism, and alleged atrocities against 
children. The mobilization drew upon existing identities, yet cannot be understood adequately 
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in terms of existing identities and the activation of existing group norms. Is the Occupy 
Movement, for example, to be understood as an expression of class conflict (or of anarchist 
and anti-capitalist groups) or is it a new group with new norms? During the Arab Spring, the 
protesters in Egypt and Tunisia represented themselves as national liberation movements that 
served the interests of the people in opposition to national governments. Those governments 
portrayed the protesters as disloyal troublemakers stirred up by foreign interference 
(McGarty, Thomas, Lala, Smith, & Bliuc, in press). The groups that emerged could not be 
easily categorized into, for example, secularists and Islamists (Murphy, 2011).  
We propose that these new groups were not easily represented by the pre-existing 
social structure because they were founded on shared ideas about reforming that structure. 
Those ideas about reform — when communicated and validated  became the basis for new 
shared social identities which in turn become the basis for new social movements. In that 
way, when one person speaks publicly about a grievance, this signals to others that change is 
desirable (providing “a tiny ripple of hope”) and that action should be taken to bring about 
that change (an injunctive norm). The novel mechanism that this article describes then is how 
grievances about the existing social structure lead to the sharing of injunctive norms and the 
formation of new social change identities. This stands as a counterpoint to the idea that 
collective action flows from adherence to the norms of existing groups that were made salient 
by aspects of the existing socio-structural context.  
Of course, individuals’ ideas about reform can be rejected by others. So how does one 
idea become more successful (in terms of gathering support and followers) than another? The 
intergroup context will provide important drivers here. It has been argued that collective 
action is not only dependent upon intragroup processes, but also depends on intergroup 
processes. In this regard, according to the elaborated social identity model of crowd behavior 
(ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000), the identity content (including norms) of one group depends 
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upon ingroup members’ perceptions of the actions of a relevant outgroup. A new inter-group 
dynamic can emerge if members of one group hold a different understanding of their social 
position to that held by an out-group, and if the out-group has power over ingroup members 
and can wield this power to enact that understanding (this was later termed collective self-
objectification; Drury & Reicher, 2009). Identity and norms are conceptualized as being 
linked by a process of intergroup interactions.  
We agree that intra- and inter-group processes are intimately connected. For example, 
individuals advocating confrontational action are likely to be less influential in their 
communications with other people when there is a powerful shared outgroup that is broadly 
seen as legitimate rather than illegitimate. However, there are two important omissions in 
ESIM. First, although a contrasting outgroup perspective (and hostile outgroup action) can be 
helpful for stimulating change, this is not essential for change. That is, there need not be a 
meaningful outgroup against which to mobilize action. A charitable social movement can 
form without contrasting itself from a specific outgroup. Therefore, any account of social 
change action must allow for outgroups to be of variable importance. 
Second, the interpersonal and intragroup nature of interaction in initiating action is 
underemphasized in ESIM. As we explain above, structural and intergroup factors are 
crucially important in shaping social change action. However, prior to social change action 
people must speak out. We complement ESIM’s account of structural and intergroup factors 
by considering the role of normative conflict and disputation within a community in the 
emergence of social movements. 
The gap that we seek to fill can be seen in empirical work on ESIM. For example, 
Drury, Reicher and Stott (2003) provide compelling evidence that due to conflict with the 
police and a breakdown of a division between locals and outsiders, the collective identity of 
British anti-road protesters transformed and intensified into an activist identity defined by the 
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need to defend their local community from external depredations. However, ESIM and the 
account of collective resistance that goes with it do not explain the processes that occurred in 
advance of the collective action and the spontaneous emergence of agreed norms in the 
crowd. The INN-formation process would explain how opponents of the roads agreed to stage 
and attend a protest, or decide for example, that nonviolent direct action (as opposed to 
violent action or mere protest or lobbying) was an appropriate (normative) response. We 
explain this process below. 
Normative Conflict: Perceived Discrepancies between Descriptive Norms and Injunctive 
Norms Help Propel Social Change 
Contextual triggers can create the opportunity for social change if they discredit 
existing groups or raise concerns about the adequacy of current policy-making processes 
(Cortell & Peterson, 1999). People may perceive this as a discrepancy between a group’s 
actual behavior and their personal alternative ideal or moral standard. In other words, an 
individual experiences a normative conflict between the descriptive social norm (“we do”) 
and their personal ideas about the injunctive social norm (“we should do”). A normative 
conflict is defined here as an individual’s experience of a discrepancy between a descriptive 
norm manifesting in an existing group and his or her personal ideas about the injunctive 
norm. The disjunction between personal ideas about injunctive norms (in a moral sense – i.e., 
the ideal) and descriptive norms (what is currently the normative behavior in an existing 
group) creates a sense of grievance, and will motivate the individual to communicate his or 
her ideas about the injunctive norm. There may also be a normative conflict between personal 
injunctive norm and an existing group’s injunctive norm. Either form of normative conflict 
may give rise to the communication of ideas for social reform. 
Normative conflicts are likely to be associated with specific cognitions and emotional 
reactions that are associated with increased motivation for action. The collective action 
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literature suggests that people are more likely to take action where they believe that action 
will be efficacious and where they experience emotions that support that action (e.g., Thomas 
et al., 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2008). People should be more likely to advocate action that 
they think will be efficacious. Normative conflict is also an inherently emotional experience. 
When we state how things should be, we also state that the status quo is unsatisfactory. That 
is, we speak out about conditions that are unjust or otherwise reflect a violation of standards. 
Thus, a person who feels that their group has been oppressed may speak out in anger; a 
person who feels their community has been forgotten may feel moral outrage at the system; 
but someone who senses that their group has exploited another might argue for restorative 
gestures following feelings of guilt.   
 An important point is that when an individual experiences a normative conflict, he or 
she is likely to be motivated to speak out against the perceived discrepancy between the way 
the world is (descriptive norm) and the way they believe the world should be (their personal 
injunctive norm). Voicing this discrepancy can in turn spark interpersonal discussion about 
the appropriateness of particular social change actions. The need for an appropriate shared 
injunctive norm is a boundary condition for INN formation (see below). If people do not 
reach agreement on a new shared injunctive norm, then an INN cannot form.  
The normative conflict model of dissent (Packer, 2008; Packer & Chasteen, 2010) 
argues that dissent can be the ultimate expression of group loyalty: highly identified group 
members can act counter-normatively when they perceive existing group norms to be against 
the interests of the group. While ingroup critics can reform the ingroup, we suggest that they 
might instead help to form new groups that develop new norms premised around their ideas 
for how the world should change (assuming critical ideas are validated by some, but not all, 
members of the existing group). 
Similarly, Hornsey (2006) argues that people often criticize behavior within their 
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group that they find problematic. Indeed, a great deal of political communication involves 
arguments for change and the creation of cognitive alternatives to the status quo. Extreme 
examples of this include agitation propaganda that often involve pointing to disorder or 
disloyalty within the group. Routine political rhetoric where speakers seek support by arguing 
against alternatives that are presented as being inconsistent with social norms, values and 
interests of the listeners (see e.g., Krebs & Jackson, 2007). 
While both Hornsey and Packer argue that conflict between an ideal and an existing 
standard can provide the impetus for intra-group dissent, here we suggest that these same 
processes can precipitate the formation of new groups. That is, conflicts between what is and 
what should be can also be the basis for novel group formation, where the act of speaking out 
may set in motion the processes that lead to the development of a new identity, premised 
upon the norms for change voiced by the dissenter(s). This process was captured in part by 
Sani and Reicher’s work on schism (e.g., Sani & Reicher, 1998).  
Sani and colleagues demonstrated that boundaries of agreement and disagreement 
delineate new groups within old social structures. These new groups are often based on an 
injunctive norm, rather than on the previous, pre-existing category membership and 
associated descriptive norms. New political groups can emerge in this way to fill a gap in the 
body politic (see Miragliotta, 2012). Similarly, in his theory of conversion behavior, 
Moscovici (1980) argued that social change stems from a challenge to the orthodoxy by 
members of radical minorities whose consistent style of behavior created uncertainty about 
the status quo. It seems therefore, that disagreement and discussion on descriptive norms can 
be the basis of the emergence of new groups from the old social structure.  
As we explain in the next section, when people raise their concerns with others 
through social interaction, this provides the opportunity for them to resolve their uncertainty 
on specific issues (Festinger, 1954), and to transform their subjective experience of normative 
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conflict into a shared understanding of apparently objective reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996).  
Validation and Consensualizing Ideas about Social Change Action 
We suggest that two criteria need to be satisfied in order for new groups to form 
around injunctive norms. First, voiced opinions about social change action (the injunctive 
norm) have to be perceived to be shared by others (i.e., to become consensual) and second, 
they need to be socially validated (Table 1, Figure 1; cf. Festinger, 1954; Hardin & Higgins, 
1996; Haslam et al., 1998). Previous research has shown that consensus functions as a source 
of validation (Baron et al., 1996). Social validation is defined as feedback that provides 
people with information about the characteristics, behaviors or beliefs that others consider 
desirable (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008, pp. 342-343). Ashforth and colleagues (2008) 
argue that this social validation may be the underlying mechanism by which people guide 
each other’s understanding of their preferred social reality and how to act within it. Thus, this 
validation can influence the social behavior of the individuals who have consensualized 
during discussion (Smith & Postmes, 2011a, 2011b).  
There is also evidence that perceptions of social validation from other people can 
encourage the development of identification with a new group (Smith, Amiot, Callan, Terry, 
& Smith, 2012; Smith, Amiot, Smith, Callan & Terry, 2013). Therefore, it seems that 
validating and consensual communication can both enhance attachment between individuals 
and increase their ability to coordinate social actions that they collectively see as desirable – 
i.e., the shared injunctive norm. In support of this, there is evidence that when people are 
asked to consensualize on a topic or idea (that is, reach consensus through discussion), this 
transforms their perceptions of a group norm (Smith & Postmes, 2009, 2011a, 2011b), and 
precipitates connection to novel identities which in turn provides the basis for their collective 
behavior. Discussion also increases awareness of a shared grievance, and this can increase 
political action intentions (Thomas et al., in press; cf. Simon & Klandermans, 2001). This 
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suggests that interaction can change collective behavior through increasing people’s 
awareness of a shared normative conflict. Using the same basic assumptions, the ASPIRe 
model (Haslam, Eggins, & Reynolds, 2003) outlines the ways that a meaningful identity can 
be form through a process of negotiation and reaching agreement.  
Arguably, some of the best examples of the validating power of social interaction can 
be seen in the civil protests in North Africa in 2010 and 2011. The rapid growth of popular 
dissent in Tunisia and Egypt was made possible by the rapid dissemination of images of 
protest spread by word of mouth and through a combination of video sharing sites and 
satellite television networks (Howard et al., 2011, McGarty et al., in press). These images 
were converted into an oppositional consensus that found its expression on the streets but was 
supported by highly visible and attention grabbing campaigns on social media platforms such 
as Facebook and YouTube (Howard & Hussain, 2011). Next, we consider how this process 
has been seen in previous research on both norm formation and identity formation, and their 
conjunction. 
Forming the Identity-Norm Nexus 
Making collective decisions about actions can fundamentally change individuals’ 
behavior (Lewin, 1953). For example, Sherif and colleagues (1961) argued that through small 
group interaction, a set of norms is standardized that regulates the relations and activities 
within the group and with non-members and outgroups. After interacting, group members 
tend to make different decisions than do individuals on their own. Group discussion can 
polarize individual group members’ pre-discussion opinions and attitudes about a variety of 
issues to more extreme positions, in the direction in which they already tended (Moscovici & 
Zavalloni, 1969). Theories of social cohesion (e.g., interdependence theory, Kelley & 
Thibaut, 1978) similarly situated emergent norms within the shared life space of multiple 
individuals. We suggest that as these group norms emerge, they can become integrated with a 
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new understanding of self-hood, or identity. 
However, self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987) would explain the 
norm formation above quite differently. First, SCT proposes that before shared norms can 
become focal, identities must form through a process of metacontrast. That is, people form 
identities by clustering the self with similar others and separating the self from those who are 
different.  For example, under this theory, an environmental identity would be expected to 
form where current goals or past experience made environmental issues accessible and where 
relatively similar other people acted in pro-environmental ways and relatively different 
people did not. The norms associated with this new social identity would then be inferred by 
the members on the basis of the responses that are most prototypical for the group. In other 
words, norm formation is a consequence of identity formation.   
We suggest that group polarization is evidence of the process of the formation of a 
new identity-norm nexus, formed as people share and reach agreement about their personal 
opinions about appropriate behaviors (Table 1). Therefore, as Moscovici (1980) argued, 
polarization is actually an example of the process of normalization, or norm formation. We 
propose that identities can form around - and are thus founded in - these norms. Here, we see 
the tension between the two explanations of norm formation: the first, articulated by SCT, 
treats norms as being activated based on perceptions of context; and the second treats norms 
as constructed during interaction. We agree that both processes are important but the latter 
has been largely ignored in research on social change and collective action.  
One exception is the interactive model of identity formation (IMIF), which outlines 
both a top-down route to identity formation through an individual’s perceptions of the 
intergroup context (the deductive pathway) and a bottom-up route to identity formation via 
communication between individuals (the inductive pathway). The “inductive” pathway 
specifies that people can shape social identity and the content of group norms. This may 
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occur through observation of other group members’ behavior or explicit or implicit 
negotiations over their understanding of social reality (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). The 
inductive pathway recognizes that social validation by other individuals is necessary to 
establish those individual perceptions as consensual social reality.  
In arguing that social identities form through intragroup communication processes, 
our account adopts the inductive pathway of the IMIF. However, that model does not answer 
two critical questions: first, when will people be motivated to develop new identities through 
interaction by seeking to convert others to their cause? We build upon the IMIF by 
suggesting that people will seek to convert others when they perceive a normative conflict 
(Table 1). By speaking out, they can create new shared injunctive norms associated with new 
identities that provide the collective impetus to reduce the discrepancy between the new 
injunctive norm and prevailing conditions over time. 
The second question raised but not answered by the IMIF is, how does inductive 
identity formation impact upon social change? We propose that because the new identities 
emerge from a normative conflict and are based upon shared injunctive norms, social change 
action flows from the INN-formation mechanism. There is extensive evidence that new 
identities that are developed through interaction and are based around shared norms are 
powerfully linked to social change action. Research into opinion-based identities (e.g., Bliuc, 
McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007) demonstrates that acting upon those ideals is a 
critical, defining and normative part of their identity – being and acting are co-dependent. 
Being a member of an opinion-based group is a powerful predictor of intentions to take 
socio-political action on a wide variety of different issues (Bliuc et al., 2007; Cameron & 
Nickerson, 2009; Gee & McGarty, 2013; Musgrove & McGarty, 2008; O'Brien & McGarty, 
2009; Smith & Postmes, 2011a; Thomas & McGarty, 2009; Thomas et al., 2012).  
This interactive explanation of norms and identity formation and behavioral change 
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harmonizes with the famous findings of Sherif and colleagues (1961) and Lewin (1953) as 
well as the group polarization phenomenon (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). It updates the 
SCT account of identity and norm formation: rather than social identity formation always 
leading to norm formation, norms can themselves be the basis for the formation of new 
groups. 
Having described the psychological mechanics of INN-formation and reviewed 
empirical evidence for the link between INN-formation and social change action, we now 
consider some examples of recent social movements that exemplify the processes: the 
Occupy Movement and Kony 2012. 
Socio-political action 
The Occupy movement. Members of the Occupy movement stated that they are “the 
99%” gathering in protest against the actions of the “1%”: those financiers whom they held 
responsible for destabilizing the global economy (i.e., it is the formation of a new social 
movement rather than the explicit mobilization of an existing one, e.g., the ‘working 
classes’). The disparity in wealth between the super-rich and ‘average’ citizens combined 
with corporate influence on democracy presented a grievance, or normative conflict, between 
what people viewed ‘should be’ versus ‘actually was’. This created an opportunity structure 
for social change that the Occupy movement aimed to capitalize upon. The shared injunctive 
norm upon which members of the Occupy movement’s shared identity was based was to 
petition governments to change the way in which financial institutions were regulated in 
order to combat economic inequality, greed and corruption in the financial services.  
The normative conflict was brought to prominence in September 2011 by the 
‘Adbusters’ group. Their anti-consumerist publication emailed its subscribers with the action 
statement, ‘America needs its own Tahrir’ (Fleming, 2011). Micah White, of Adbusters, 
suggested this helped the movement to snowball (Schwartz, 2011). Social media and public 
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meetings were then crucial for advertising and recruiting members for the protest movement. 
The movement first protested on September 17th, 2011 in Zuccotti Park, in New York’s Wall 
Street financial district. By October 9th, similar protest groups had formed in 82 countries 
around the world, with a similar growth in online presence (Berkowitz, 2011). 
The Occupy Movement rapidly developed decision making processes, which became 
hallmarks of the movement. The public assemblies through which the Occupy movements 
made decisions were described as follows: 
“The ‘Occupy Wall Street’ and related movements represent a resurgence of direct 
democracy – not really known since ancient times. […] The advantage is that their 
decisions can more truly represent the will of the people, and be more satisfying to the 
participants than decisions made by elected leaders.” (Levinson, as quoted in Wood & 
Goodale, 2011) 
Williams (2012) argues that the movement is inspired by and follows many of the 
processes of anarchism. However, due to the spontaneous growth of the movement, the 
Occupy Movement cannot be represented as “just anarchism” any more than it could be said 
to be “just” socialism or anti-globalization. Indeed, Bamyeh (2012) describes the Occupy 
Movement as part of a new global culture of protest that began on December 17, 2010 in Sidi 
Bouzid in Tunisia. 
The emergent deliberative processes of the Occupy Movement are very clear 
instantiations of the interactive phases of INN-formation. These interactive processes may not 
have been successful in achieving the aims of the movement, but they were repeatedly 
effective in generating unified socio-political action such as marches, demonstrations and 
protests. 
Kony 2012. Kony 2012 was a global campaign formed with the goal of bringing 
Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony to justice. The movement followed the 
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circulation of a 30-minute film, produced by the non-governmental organization Invisible 
Children that detailed Kony’s atrocities against children, especially in relation to the use of 
child soldiers.  
The normative conflict is easy to see here. Children were being forced to serve in 
brutal military forces where they became perpetrators, victims and witnesses of atrocities. At 
the same time governments were seen to be doing nothing. The Kony 2012 movement 
generated enormous interest with many tens of millions of viewings of the film on video-
sharing sites. The movement was intended to generate participation in collective action, 
specifically a Cover the Night campaign on April 20, 2012 where supporters of the campaign 
were encouraged to put up posters and otherwise publicize the campaign. The campaign was 
global, claiming to involve 204 countries and 3.6 million pledges of support 
http://ctn.kony2012.com/     
The content of this campaign is intriguing. As shown on the Invisible Children 
website, the posters for the US side of the campaign involved the symbols of the US 
Democratic and Republican parties blended to form a dove of peace with the tag line “One 
thing we can all agree on”. That is, the campaign explicitly sought to step above existing 
partisan identities to appeal for a united approach to address the issue. The originators of the 
campaign, however, took some unusual steps that affected the ability of the INN members to 
coordinate their action. They called for global action on April 20, 2012 but they decided not 
to identify specific meeting places or to facilitate the coordination of local meetings. 
Despite the enormous reach of the film, participation on the day of action was 
extremely low. We attribute this to the mixed approach taken by Invisible Children. Although 
they voiced normative conflict by seeking to expose both Kony’s alleged atrocities Kony and 
the inaction of governments, they did not facilitate social interaction between people that 
could cement INN-formation by giving them the opportunity to coordinate. There was no 
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mechanism for people to agree on plans for action. Whereas video sharing was an excellent 
medium for disseminating the message across a wide geographical range, it did not provide a 
mechanism to agree on coordinated local action. In effect, Kony 2012 was a media 
phenomenon but it stalled as a social movement because of the steps the originators took to 
limit social interaction.  
Examination of the case vignettes above and the emerging body of theory and 
laboratory research supports the proposition that first, INN-formation is an important part of 
the psychological process that leads to social change, and second, reaching agreement on 
concrete ideas for social change action (i.e., injunctive norms) critically underpin this 
process. As in the Kony example, without agreement on action, INN-formation may not help 
produce social change. Having described these mechanisms, the evidence for them and 
examples of their instantiation in the real world, we now turn to the boundary conditions that 
moderate the effects of social interaction on social change action. 
Boundary Conditions and Caveats  
The most important caveat here is that nothing in this paper should be taken to 
suggest that INN-formation takes place prior to or without reference to the existence of social 
structure or ideology. Existing group memberships and understandings of the structure of the 
society are powerful factors that are implicated in changes that are not initiated by citizens 
speaking out and are not well explained by our model. 
Second, the collective action literature already details the social and contextual 
conditions through which groups are mobilized to act in hostile and pro-social ways (e.g., 
Thomas et al., 2009; van Zomeren et al. 2008). These moderators should also moderate the 
relationship between social interaction and social action because cognitions about socio-
structural factors may form a basis for people to perceive normative conflict, and will thus be 
the focus of group discussion. Potentially, anything that interrupts the flow of processes 
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depicted in Figure 1 and Table 1 should effectively moderate INN formation. Below, we 
focus on two specific moderators. 
INNs for groups supporting and opposing change. The first moderator is social 
change orientation. In order to mobilize action, INNs should be formed around a norm for 
changing the status quo (i.e., a new injunctive norm), rather than support for maintaining the 
status quo (i.e., the existing descriptive norm). Evidence of this moderator comes from two 
recent studies by Hartley, McGarty and Donaghue (2013) that show that identification with 
opinion-based groups can be a weak predictor of social change action intentions. The result is 
intriguing because it was found for only one side of a political conflict. Opinion-based group 
identification predicted political action intentions for (non-Indigenous) Australian supporters 
of financial compensation of Indigenous Australian but not for opponents of the 
compensation. In this case, the opponents of compensation were endorsing a secure status 
quo position as the Australian Government had decided not to pay compensation and was 
supported in this decision by the main opposition party. Highly identified opponents of 
compensation did not need to act to achieve their desired state of affairs. We suggest that 
INN-formation is not limited to change-oriented groups but tends to fit these groups better. 
The experience of validating and consensual interaction about social change 
action. The research we reviewed above suggested that through validating social interaction, 
shared norms can emerge to regulate peoples’ relationships and actions (cf. Kelley & 
Thibaut, 1978; Postmes, Haslam, et al., 2005; Sherif et al., 1961). We have suggested that 
people will seek to engage others in social interaction if they feel aggrieved because of a 
discrepancy between how the world is and how they believe it should be. INN-formation is 
contingent on these ideas being socially validated by other individuals, which establishes 
individual’s perceptions as shared social reality. 
Evidence for this moderator comes from research in which the topic of interaction 
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affected the impact of interaction on social action by limiting the degree to which the 
interactive group could reach consensus or validate each other. For example, Smith and 
Postmes’ (2011a; Study 2) participants were asked to engage in a discussion about either the 
out-group stereotype (immigrants) or the stereotype plus a plan for action “to combat any 
problems immigration causes”. Action intentions were significantly higher after discussion of 
the stereotype than after discussion of the stereotype plus courses of action. Notably, there 
was significantly less certainty (and less validation) and more variability on action when 
participants were asked to discuss a concrete plan of action than when groups discussed only 
the outgroup stereotype. The authors concluded that there may have been difficulties in 
reaching a consensual plan for action because participants were unwilling to endorse the 
political position of taking action against a lower status out-group. Increasing the salience of 
sensitive political identities may have intensified disagreement within the discussion group 
on appropriate actions.  
This specific instantiation of INN breakdown is exemplified by the dynamics in 
specific social movement organizations (e.g., Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd Conservation 
Society, or SSCS) within the broader environmental movement. In this case, all group 
members agree as to the impetus for environmental action to, for example, protect the world’s 
oceans. However, Greenpeace advocates political and diplomatic methods, while SSCS 
advocate the use of more controversial direct action tactics (Scarce, 2006). This disagreement 
of methods led to a schism between the two groups and is the subject of ongoing vitriolic 
interaction between members of the groups (Stuart, Thomas, Donaghue, & Russell, 2013). 
The key point is that where the social context creates conditions for invalidating (Smith & 
Postmes, 2011a) and/or schismatic social interaction (Sani & Reicher, 1998), INN formation 
may stall. 
Implications and conclusions 
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While existing theory is well equipped to address the emergence of collective 
phenomena shaped by pre-existing identities, it is our contention that these are relatively less 
well equipped to explain the emergence of movements such as Occupy, Kony 2012 and the 
events that have recently shaped the Middle East and Northern Africa. We have argued that, 
under specific conditions, new, shared identities premised upon norms for social change can 
emerge from social interaction about a perceived discrepancy between the way the world is 
and should be.  
The evidence reviewed here demonstrates that there are occasions on which agreeing 
with others about appropriate social behavior delineates new, shared norms and identities. 
Our work therefore provides a cautionary note in relation to the application of established 
social categories and existing organizations. In addition, our discussion of boundary 
conditions provides a blueprint for the generation of testable hypotheses about the process of 
INN-formation. It is time for a return to the building blocks of human social behavior: social 
interaction. We hope to stimulate research that shows that, rather than being slaves to the 
social context, people are agents with the potential to collectively be the change they want to 
see in the world.  
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Table 1 
The formation of an identity-norm nexus 
Stage Process 
   
1. An individual experiences a 
normative conflict  
An individual perceives an unacceptable violation of his/her personal ideals by a descriptive social norm 
manifesting in an existing group. The individual develops ideas about the change(s) s/he wants to see in 
the world (personal ideas about the injunctive norm). 
   
2. Communication of 
perceptions and cognitions 
The individual communicates (shares and exchanges) his or her perceptions, cognitions and emotions 
about the normative conflict and the injunctive norm. 
   
3. Communicating individuals 
develop ideas about the 
change(s) they want to see in 
the world (ideas for shared 
injunctive norm). 
Opportunity for social validation of ideas; shared cognition; establishment of new shared reality; 
formation of shared injunctive norms and development of shared social identity premised on shared ideas 
for social change. 
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4. Formation of identity-norm 
nexus 
Those communicating individuals perceive their perceptions, cognitions and emotions are 
validated/shared (or not validated/shared) by each other to some extent. Communicators with shared 
views define themselves as members of a distinct social category (commonly self-categorize). The 
category is defined by the constituent individuals’ shared and aligned perceptions, cognitions and 
emotions about the injunctive norm (identity-norm nexus; INN); Shared cognition about reality emerges. 
   
5. Socio-political action Those commonly self-categorized individuals coordinate and enact appropriate ingroup action, using the 
INN’s shared understanding about reality as a psychological platform for mobilization. The social actions 
stemming from the INN are criterial attributes of category membership. Certain appropriate, expected or 
desirable behaviors are used to define the category as different from other categories.  
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Figure 1. Communication leading to the formation of shared injunctive norms and social change 
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